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Philosophy
An Alternative Understanding
of the Amoralist
Jaeyoung Lee
Mentor: Julia Driver
In this paper, I attempt to provide an alternative account of the amoralist challenge to
Internalism, which provides the Internalist with a more amenable understanding of the
amoralist. With this alternative understanding of the amoralist, Internalists can allow
for the existence of amoralists without having to give up the core Internalists
commitment. I understand the core Internalist commitment to be that there is a
necessary relationship between moral beliefs and motivation. Through examining
various Internalist positions, I identify several desiderata we wish an Internalist theory
would meet beyond accepting the core Internalist position. I attempt to incorporate
these insights into my own Internalist views and address them in relation to the
amoralist challenge.
An amoralist is someone who allegedly makes a sincere moral judgment and is not
motivated by this judgment. The conceptual possibility or actual instances of amoralists
would therefore pose a critical challenge to the core Internalist commitment. I explore
the ways in which this challenge has been developed and provide a more concrete
picture of how the amoralist can be posed as a challenge to the core Internalist
commitment.
Finally, I develop my own Internalist view, which puts judgment and the structure
of our practical deliberation at the center of the necessary relationship between moral
judgment and motivation. I argue for this position by examining the role of judgment
in our practical deliberation and the entailments of judging something to be a reason
within one’s own practical deliberation. I then offer an account of the amoralist from
this position that suggests that an amoralist can be understood as merely recognizing
these moral reasons without judging them to be reasons for himself. I argue that this
“recognition thesis” is able to grapple with the various ways in which the amoralist
challenge has been posed.
